A brave airman and an even better man, SSgt. Charles Maples of the "Draggin Lady" took his last flight on
31 January 2011. It was an honor to have talked and interviewed Charles, and he will always be missed.
-R. Cookson
31 January 2011. It was an honor to have talked and interviewed Charles, and he will always be missed.
-R. Cookson
"Well, here comes the lady, draggin in at last."
Charles Maples reference on how the "Draggin Lady" was named after a long, desperate mission and being one of the very last planes to arrive on Saipan.
Charles Maples reference on how the "Draggin Lady" was named after a long, desperate mission and being one of the very last planes to arrive on Saipan.
"It is sad. Half of the people do not know, and the other half do not care."
Charles Maples thoughts on how the people of the U.S. today, view the horrors of WWII.
Charles Maples thoughts on how the people of the U.S. today, view the horrors of WWII.
(From R.Cookson)
On January 12, 2011, I spoke with radio operator SSgt Charles Maples of the "Draggin' Lady," who explained why 8 Dec 1944 was Uncle Bob's last flight with his original crew.
SSgt Maples stated: "Cookson did fly with Lt. Calhoun on the practice mission to bomb Iwo Jima on 8 December 1945".
He told me that everyone on the plane had access to the telephone and that upon approaching the target, they could hear "Cookson telling the pilot that the lead plane was waiting too long to open his bomb bay doors." (Calhoun aircraft was the deputy lead plane.) A few seconds later, SSgt Maples said they heard Cookson come on the telephone again and this time tell the pilot that "the lead plane was going to miss the target all the way." At this point, according to SSgt Maples, the pilot gave Uncle Bob permission to make the bomb run on Iwo Jima himself, using his settings.
So, the Calhoun plane bombed the target independently of the lead plane using Uncle Bob's calculations.
According to SSgt Maples, just a couple of days later, they learned that Uncle Bob was being transferred to the crew of Major Fitzgerald, and said they hated to lose him because he was a really good guy.
The purpose of this practice mission to Iwo Jima according to SSgt Maples was to bomb the Japanese planes and airfields to hinder their ability to stage attacks on our bases on Saipan. When not flying, he stated the "boys played a lot of ball, and dodged Japanese bullets," which he said, "kept us entertained." He added that the "Japanese sent planes from Iwo Jima, and at night, would strafe the planes parked on the runway. The Japanese were good pilots."
Charles Maples' matter of fact approach to his service in the Pacific.
MISSION ACCOUNT
8 Dec 44
Finally today the mission to Iwo Jima got off. The men of the 73rd Bomb Wing were eager to strike back at the location from which the recent damaging air raids had originated. This was to be a coordinated attack involving several different forces. First, P-38's from Saipan would make a fighter sweep. Then the B-29's of the 73rd would make their bombing attack, followed by B-24's of the 7th Air Force. The Navy would finish up with a surface bombardment.
For the 73rd, this mission would also serve useful training purposes. Many new crews had reported in the last week or so and they could use a "milk run" as a training mission. Also, the command was well aware of the poor bombing accuracy in the high-altitude missions against Japan. A mission to Iwo would provide badly needed practice for the crews.
A dry run on Pajores Island on the way back was also laid on for even more training.
The 500th Bomb Group scheduled 22 aircraft for this mission, divided into two combat squadrons of 11 planes each, as follows:
First Squadron
Z-4, “Black Magic”, Fitzgerald/Dougherty
Z-6, “Draggin' Lady”, Calhoun/Reeve
Z-3, “Snafu-perfort”, Brown
Z-48, “Million Dollar Baby”, Black
Z-45, “Mustn't Touch”, Standen
Z-49, “Three Feathers”, Amos
Z-43, Setterich
Z-9, “Nina Ross”, Pearson
Z-10, “Punchin' Judy”, H. Jackson
Z-46, “Su Su Baby”, Holmes
Z-47, “Adam's Eve”, Adams
Second Squadron
Z-22, “Leading Lady”, Hurlbutt/Mullen
Z-21, “Devils' Delight”, Pierce/Roberts
Z-23, “Ramblin Roscoe”, Hays/Brannock
Z-26, “Tokyo Local”, Grise
Z-41, “The Baroness”, Barron
Z-28, “Old Ironsides”, Gerwick/Parsons
Z-27, Cordray
Z-24, “Pride of the Yankees”, Tackett
Z-29, “Pacific Queen”, Savage
Z-50, “Fancy Detail”, Braden
Z-30, “Slick Dick”, LaMarche
Leading the Group and the first squadron in Z-4 with the Fitzgerald crew was newly appointed Group CO, Lt Col John Dougherty, now in command after the loss of Col Richard King on 3 Dec.
First squadron deputy leader in Z-6 with the Calhoun crew was 881st Squadron CO Lt Col Ralph “Pete” Reeve.
Leading the second squadron in Z-22 with the Hurlbutt crew was former Group Operations Officer Lt Col Marcus Mullen, now moved up to Deputy Group Commander.
Second squadron deputy leader was 882nd Squadron Operations Officer Maj Frank Roberts, flying in Z-21 with the Pierce crew.
Other brass were on this mission as well. Two that are known were Lt Col Joseph "Toby" Brannock, CO 882nd Squadron, riding in Z-23 with the Hays crew, and Maj Freeman Parsons, newly appointed Group Operations Officer replacing Mullen, flying in Z-28 with the Gerwick crew.
The personnel summary lists 7 additional pilots (copilots), indicating that many regular copilots who were bumped from the right seat decided to go along in some capacity anyway. 2/Lt Robert Copeland, regular copilot on the Fitzgerald crew but displaced from his seat by Lt Col Dougherty, in turn bumped the tail gunner and flew in his place. (Copeland didn't enjoy the experience. “...It's really horrible back there”). Other copilots may have done something similar.
The personnel summary also indicates the presence of an additional staff bombardier, navigator and flight engineer, as well as two “observers”, but no names are given. The amount of rank on this “milk run” probably led to some disparaging comments from the regular crews.
The 500th Bomb Group led the Wing on this mission. Take-off was from 0656 to 0716 local. Bomb load was entirely
500 lb M64 GP bombs.
For this relatively short-range mission (only 700 miles) auxiliary fuel tanks were not needed and most of the B-29's could for the first time carry a full bomb load.
Eighteen aircraft carried 40 bombs; four aircraft carried only 32.
One plane, Z-10, failed to take off on time due to a problem with the putt-putt, but it was fixed and Z-10 was able to take off later with the 498th Group at 0755.
The Holmes crew in Z-46 had quite a scare during take-off. By the account of flight engineer 2/Lt Robert Sebring, everything seemed normal as they pulled into take-off position, ran up the engines to take-off power, released the brakes and began to roll down the runway. “However, as the airplane increased forward speed one engine increased the RPM, and by the time we were halfway down the runway and committed, the prop pitch had flattened out to providing no thrust and the engine was screaming with the tachometer at the high end stop.” This was every crew's nightmare, losing an engine during take-off with a fully loaded plane. You couldn't get into the air with only three engines but there was insufficient runway left to bring the plane to a stop.
The expected result was a crash over the cliff at the end of the runway and a huge explosion. Quick action was called for and Ted Holmes, an excellent pilot, was up to the challenge. “Ted had no response from the normal prop controls but he tamed it with the feathering button and then by alternately partially unfeathering and feathering he could keep the engine speed and the prop pitch operating in a range where some thrust was contributed and we staggered into the air.
When we had enough altitude and got the gear and flaps up he feathered the engine totally and I shut it down. We contacted the tower and went out to sea and jettisoned the bomb load and then flew a pattern to burn up gas and wait for the rest of the Wing to take off and clear the field so we could land.”
There were two additional aborts on the way to the target. Z-47 experienced continuous backfire and detonation in
#1 engine, and Z-30 blew a cylinder in #2 engine.
The three aborts and the delayed take-off by Z-10 left the group with only 18 planes in its formation, 8 in the first squadron and 10 in the second.
It was very cloudy over this part of the Pacific today and somewhere along the way the second squadron (Mullen) passed the first squadron (Dougherty) and reached the target first. In fact, Mullen's squadron got there an hour before Dougherty's, which had some navigation and other difficulties. Iwo was cloud-covered so bombs were dropped by radar.
The ten planes remaining in Mullen's squadron made a good bomb run at 20,650 feet and apparently dropped on the target, which was the Japanese air fields. Of course, with the cloud cover no impacts could be observed., but John Ciardi, right gunner on the Cordray crew in Z-27, which was leading the third element, had a good view of the formation as the 40 or so bombs from each plane cascaded down. "The top of the overcast was at 15,000 and we were at 19,600"
[20,650 according to mission records].
As the last bombs cleared the bomb bays I noticed the first bombs disappear into the clouds – a 5000 ft. ladder of them hanging below each ship.” Things did not go as smoothly in Dougherty's squadron. The 500th BG Mission Summary describes it this way:
"The lead ship's [Z-4] radar went out and it was forced to change leads with the deputy. The deputy leader's [Z-6] radar went out and the lead was passed back to the original leader who was able to operate his radar at close range only. The bomb run was made on a heading of 59 degrees instead of the scheduled heading of 39 degrees.
At the same time, the bomb release line in the radar scope was mistakenly identified and the lead ship failed to release bombs at the correct time. The deputy leader, whose radar was partially operative and who was also sighting for range and deflection, then dropped his bombs at 0118Z [1118 local], about three seconds after the indices crossed, and all but two ships in the formation dropped on him. From reports of observed bomb hits, all bombs dropped on the deputy leader struck in the target area and slightly to the east along the coast.
"The leader did not drop his bombs until about one minute later and one ship dropped on him. These bombs are reported to have landed in the water beyond the target area".
The above account appears to be a somewhat sanitized version of events.
Lt Col Dougherty apparently saw nothing to be gained in sharing embarrassing details with higher headquarters.
In particular, the summary doesn't say anything about two runs over the target, but other documents confirm that that's what happened. In fact, it was even a bit worse than that.
The most accurate and detailed description is in the Group Radar Officer's Report:
“The Navigator in the lead aircraft [Z-4, Fitzgerald crew] had difficulty in recognizing the target on the scope [the navigator had a small radar scope at his position] and made a dry run on the wrong island. When he finally located the target, he made a bad run. The squadron then made a 360 degree turn and came out on a heading of approximately 55 degrees. This was off course but the lead aircraft nevertheless continued on the bomb run. [The Radar] Operator in the lead aircraft was probably nervous and set his BRL [Bomb Release Line] incorrectly.
The deputy leader [Z-6, Calhoun crew] followed thro [sic] on the bomb run and when he had waited four seconds after the AP [Aiming Point] crossed the BRL in his scope, he dropped his bombs. The rest of the squadron dropped on the deputy leader. It is believed that these bombs fell near the east shore of the target. The leader's bombs were dropped about five seconds after those of the Deputy Leader. It is believed that the Leader's bombs dropped in the water after the squadron had passed over the island.”
The radar operator on the Calhoun (formerly Field) crew in Z-6 was Cpl Robert D. Cookson, and he was good at his job. Despite having only a partially functioning system, Cookson managed to get it to work well enough to see what was going on... and he didn't like what he was seeing. He could tell that the lead plane was waiting too long to open its bomb bay doors and warned his AC, 1/Lt Patrick Calhoun, that it looked like they were going to miss the target. Calhoun, who had just been promoted from copilot on the Brown crew to take over Field's old crew as AC, had the good judgment to rely on Cookson's judgment. They dropped on his say-so and so did most of the other planes; otherwise they would have missed the island entirely, like Fitzgerald in Z-4.
There was an interesting consequence to this incident. Maj Robert J. Fitzgerald could not have been very happy with the performance of his crew, particularly his radar operator. Since the rest of the squadron dropped on the leader, a lead crew needed the best people available.
Cookson's performance had clearly stood out. Major Fitz apparently requested that Cookson be transferred to his crew, and he got him. Three days later Cookson was radar operator on the Fitzgerald crew.
In summary, of the 19 planes which made it to the target (including Z-10 with the 498th Bomb Group), 18 successfully dropped their bombs. Z-28 could not open her front bomb bay doors and did not drop over the target. Later the doors were opened with the emergency motor and the bombs were jettisoned. Z-9 had a partial rack malfunction and got off only 36 of her 40 bombs. Of the 18 planes which dropped all or most of their bombs, 16 hit on or near the target.
There was no enemy opposition. There was no flak at all.
A few fighters were observed – from his tail gun position Bob Copeland reported seeing four of them – but none attacked. After the planned dry run over Pajores Island on the way back, all B-29's returned safely to base, landing between 1330 and 1510 local.
Getting back so early, Ciardi had ample time to get a haircut from Cpl Frank Reynolds, a CFC ground maintenance man. In the evening Ciardi and some of his friends went up to the 303rd Air Service Group theater to watch a program of native dancers, Chamorros from the Marianas and Kanakas from the Carolines.
2/Lt Ken Fine, navigator on the Hurlbutt crew, which had led the second squadron on today's mission, tried to write his fiancee Marie Sisco every day but he was too tired to write much. He did complain about receiving no mail today. He also noted that he didn't go to the show tonight since he'd already seen it twice. But he was looking forward to tomorrow night's movie, “Up in Arms” with Dinah Shore. “I saw it in Atlanta but I want to see it again as I really did enjoy it.”
Also on this day, the Parsons crew (#238) of the 882nd Squadron left Mather Field, California, for Hawaii, probably in B-29 42-65247, a replacement aircraft. After a long but uneventful flight, they landed probably at John Rodgers Field on Oahu.
The 500th BG Mission Summary describes it well:
"The lead ship's (Z-4) radar went out and it was forced to change leads with the deputy. The deputy leader's (Z-6) (Cookson-radar ) radar went out and the lead was passed back to the original leader who was able to operate his radar at close range only. The bomb run was made on a heading of 59 degrees instead of the scheduled heading of 39 degrees. At the same time, the bomb release line in the radar scope was mistakenly identified and the lead ship failed to release bombs at the correct time. The deputy leader, whose radar (Cookson) was partially operative and who was also sighting for range and deflection, then dropped his bombs at 0118Z, (1118 local), about three seconds after the indices crossed, and all but two ships in the formation dropped on him. From reports of observed bomb hits, all bombs dropped on the deputy leader struck in the target area and slight to the east along the coast."
"The leader did not drop his bombs until about one minute later and one ship dropped on him. These bombs are reported to have landed in the water beyond the target area."
Charles R. Maples video interview
Please click on the link below to watch this interesting interview of radio operator SSgt Charles Maples from the "Draggin Lady", Z Square 6.
Charles was credited with 35 combat missions over Japan in B-29's and returned to the United States in the fall of 1945 as a decorated airman. Listen as he discusses his crewmates, training, and combat missions during his time in the Air Corp.
Charles specifically mentions our Uncle Robert D. Cookson, at minute 52 of the video.
Turn up the sound and enjoy.
(Courtesy C. Maples)
Charles was credited with 35 combat missions over Japan in B-29's and returned to the United States in the fall of 1945 as a decorated airman. Listen as he discusses his crewmates, training, and combat missions during his time in the Air Corp.
Charles specifically mentions our Uncle Robert D. Cookson, at minute 52 of the video.
Turn up the sound and enjoy.
(Courtesy C. Maples)
https://vimeo.com/desilucy/maples-interview |
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Charles R. Maples Memoirs
Click the frame numbers to advance pages- clicking "play" will start the slideshow and page images will display for 9 seconds each
(Courtesy of Duane B. Maples- compiled Oct. 1997)
(Courtesy of Duane B. Maples- compiled Oct. 1997)
The following is a report by radio operator, Sgt. Charles Maples of Z Square 6, the "Draggin Lady", on the loss of Z Square 2 and the crew of A/C Capt. Joseph Irvin.
The Irvin crew was lost on 27 November 1944 after failing to return from a mission to Toyko on the "20th Century Limited."
They were badly shot up over the target. On board was an observer, Major Gerald Mosier.
All were declared MIA, and declared dead at wars end.
The Irvin crew was lost on 27 November 1944 after failing to return from a mission to Toyko on the "20th Century Limited."
They were badly shot up over the target. On board was an observer, Major Gerald Mosier.
All were declared MIA, and declared dead at wars end.
STATEMENT OF SGT. CHARLES R. MAPLES
On returning from a raid on Tokyo, and about one hour from home base I received a message from 2V534. The message was addressed to 00V530. Due to interference and static conditions 2V534 was unable to contact 00V530. I obtained permission from my Airplane Commander, Capt. Richard A. Field, to call 2V534 and receipt for his message.
After receipting for the message, 2V534 acknowledged hearing me then continued to send XXX's and SOS's possibly so the ground could shoot fixes if they heard him.
About 10 minutes later I received the final SOS and position. The position sent me was 21.00 NORTH and 147.00 EAST. This information was turned in to the group intelligence. I was flying as radio operator on plane 6V534.
We arrived over Saipan at 19.15 Saipan time.
The approximate distance from Saipan at the time of interception was 200 miles.
The signal strength of message was 4 to 5.
Charles R. Maples
Sgt., Air Corp.
881st Bomb Sq.
ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY COMMENTS FROM CONTRIBUTOR JIM BOWMAN
2V534 was the radio call sign for Z-2. 6V534 was the Morse call sign for Z-6, and 00V530 believed to be the Morse call sign for the ground station at Isley Field, Saipan. The initial digit was the number of the plane, and V534 meant the 500th Bomb Group. SOS is the distress signal. XXX is also a distress signal, but of less urgency than SOS.
Signal strength of 4 to 5 is very good. 5 being the best.
Sgt. Maples coordinates were questioned by Command H.Q., Saipan, leading to his interrogation and written statement. It appeared that 21 N, 147 E, would have placed Z-2 about 200 miles too far to the east, and far off course.
No explanation was ever found.
Bob Goldsworthy, A/C of Z-1, may have been the last to see Z-2. He told Mr. Bowman he had flown on Irvin's wing for a while on the way back from Tokyo, but the Z-2 gradually dropped back. A/C Goldsworthy said that he probably last saw
Z-2 well north of Iwo Jima as he glanced back and saw a glint of sun off of Z-2.....but that was it.
COMMENTS OF CHARLES MAPLES TO HIS SON, CRAIG, ABOUT THIS INCIDENT
Charles Maples told his son about a plane that didn't make it back, and that he had been in radio contact with that crew to obtain their coordinates before the plane went down. Charles said when his crew landed, he was whisked away and questioned about the coordinates because apparently the base command didn't understand how the plane could have been in the reported location. Charles said "I told them I was absolutely certain that the coordinates I reported were correct."
On returning from a raid on Tokyo, and about one hour from home base I received a message from 2V534. The message was addressed to 00V530. Due to interference and static conditions 2V534 was unable to contact 00V530. I obtained permission from my Airplane Commander, Capt. Richard A. Field, to call 2V534 and receipt for his message.
After receipting for the message, 2V534 acknowledged hearing me then continued to send XXX's and SOS's possibly so the ground could shoot fixes if they heard him.
About 10 minutes later I received the final SOS and position. The position sent me was 21.00 NORTH and 147.00 EAST. This information was turned in to the group intelligence. I was flying as radio operator on plane 6V534.
We arrived over Saipan at 19.15 Saipan time.
The approximate distance from Saipan at the time of interception was 200 miles.
The signal strength of message was 4 to 5.
Charles R. Maples
Sgt., Air Corp.
881st Bomb Sq.
ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY COMMENTS FROM CONTRIBUTOR JIM BOWMAN
2V534 was the radio call sign for Z-2. 6V534 was the Morse call sign for Z-6, and 00V530 believed to be the Morse call sign for the ground station at Isley Field, Saipan. The initial digit was the number of the plane, and V534 meant the 500th Bomb Group. SOS is the distress signal. XXX is also a distress signal, but of less urgency than SOS.
Signal strength of 4 to 5 is very good. 5 being the best.
Sgt. Maples coordinates were questioned by Command H.Q., Saipan, leading to his interrogation and written statement. It appeared that 21 N, 147 E, would have placed Z-2 about 200 miles too far to the east, and far off course.
No explanation was ever found.
Bob Goldsworthy, A/C of Z-1, may have been the last to see Z-2. He told Mr. Bowman he had flown on Irvin's wing for a while on the way back from Tokyo, but the Z-2 gradually dropped back. A/C Goldsworthy said that he probably last saw
Z-2 well north of Iwo Jima as he glanced back and saw a glint of sun off of Z-2.....but that was it.
COMMENTS OF CHARLES MAPLES TO HIS SON, CRAIG, ABOUT THIS INCIDENT
Charles Maples told his son about a plane that didn't make it back, and that he had been in radio contact with that crew to obtain their coordinates before the plane went down. Charles said when his crew landed, he was whisked away and questioned about the coordinates because apparently the base command didn't understand how the plane could have been in the reported location. Charles said "I told them I was absolutely certain that the coordinates I reported were correct."
27 Nov 44
On the way home the 500th Bomb Group suffered its first combat loss. Z-2, Irvin crew, had bombed the target on the wing of Z-1, Goldsworthy crew. After leaving the target area, Maj Goldsworthy “pulled over on Irvin's wing to fly a little formation. Later we gradually grew apart. I remember seeing the sun reflecting off the airplane for a while. Then I didn't see him again....”
Later, Charlie Maples, radio operator on Z-6, “Draggin' Lady”, Field crew, also on their way home and only about an hour out of Saipan, attentively picked up transmissions from Z-2, which was sending out distress calls and unsuccessfully trying to contact the ground station at Isley. Maples established contact with Z-2, took down their final position report, then transmitted all the information to base. When Z-6 landed at Isley, the crew found an officer with a jeep waiting for them. Maples, Capt Field and the navigator, 1/Lt Francis Merrick, were whisked off to headquarters, where they were interrogated by a Colonel. Probably because the ditching location Maples had reported was about 200 miles east of the expected course, the Colonel questioned whether the Sergeant had copied down the numbers correctly. Maples stood his ground, looked the Colonel in the eye, and insisted that he had accurately copied what was transmitted. As it turned out, the AC of Z-23, “Ramblin Roscoe”, Hale Hays, had also heard Z-2 send the same coordinates. Maples heard no more about the incident.
At least three Dumbo search and rescue aircraft and two destroyers were assigned to search for the crew. Joe Irvin and fellow 881st AC Ferd Curtis, recently arrived on Saipan via ATC, had known each other for three years. Curtis requested permission to take a plane out to search for his good friend. The command would not spare a B-29 for this duty but offered the Wing B-24. Curtis had not flown a B-24 in over a year and most of his crew not at all, but the next morning they gamely took the B-24 out anyway and conducted a nine-hour search. It was fruitless, though. Despite all efforts, no trace of Z-2 or the Irvin crew was ever found.
The crew of the lost plane were:
AC Capt Joseph R. Irvin
P 2/Lt Robert B. Clore
B 2/Lt Clay D. Shannon
N 2/Lt William L. Moores, Jr.
FE 2/Lt Myron C. Bjerva
Radio Sgt Alfred J. Morton
Ring G Cpl Clifford M. Fleming
RG Sgt Richard L. Connell
LG Sgt Verdal Brown
Radar Sgt Everett L. Abernathy
TG Sgt Marion E. Beery
Also, Maj Gerald L. Mosier, Operations Officer of the 881st Bomb Squadron, was riding as an observer on this plane.
(Courtesy J.Bowman)
On the way home the 500th Bomb Group suffered its first combat loss. Z-2, Irvin crew, had bombed the target on the wing of Z-1, Goldsworthy crew. After leaving the target area, Maj Goldsworthy “pulled over on Irvin's wing to fly a little formation. Later we gradually grew apart. I remember seeing the sun reflecting off the airplane for a while. Then I didn't see him again....”
Later, Charlie Maples, radio operator on Z-6, “Draggin' Lady”, Field crew, also on their way home and only about an hour out of Saipan, attentively picked up transmissions from Z-2, which was sending out distress calls and unsuccessfully trying to contact the ground station at Isley. Maples established contact with Z-2, took down their final position report, then transmitted all the information to base. When Z-6 landed at Isley, the crew found an officer with a jeep waiting for them. Maples, Capt Field and the navigator, 1/Lt Francis Merrick, were whisked off to headquarters, where they were interrogated by a Colonel. Probably because the ditching location Maples had reported was about 200 miles east of the expected course, the Colonel questioned whether the Sergeant had copied down the numbers correctly. Maples stood his ground, looked the Colonel in the eye, and insisted that he had accurately copied what was transmitted. As it turned out, the AC of Z-23, “Ramblin Roscoe”, Hale Hays, had also heard Z-2 send the same coordinates. Maples heard no more about the incident.
At least three Dumbo search and rescue aircraft and two destroyers were assigned to search for the crew. Joe Irvin and fellow 881st AC Ferd Curtis, recently arrived on Saipan via ATC, had known each other for three years. Curtis requested permission to take a plane out to search for his good friend. The command would not spare a B-29 for this duty but offered the Wing B-24. Curtis had not flown a B-24 in over a year and most of his crew not at all, but the next morning they gamely took the B-24 out anyway and conducted a nine-hour search. It was fruitless, though. Despite all efforts, no trace of Z-2 or the Irvin crew was ever found.
The crew of the lost plane were:
AC Capt Joseph R. Irvin
P 2/Lt Robert B. Clore
B 2/Lt Clay D. Shannon
N 2/Lt William L. Moores, Jr.
FE 2/Lt Myron C. Bjerva
Radio Sgt Alfred J. Morton
Ring G Cpl Clifford M. Fleming
RG Sgt Richard L. Connell
LG Sgt Verdal Brown
Radar Sgt Everett L. Abernathy
TG Sgt Marion E. Beery
Also, Maj Gerald L. Mosier, Operations Officer of the 881st Bomb Squadron, was riding as an observer on this plane.
(Courtesy J.Bowman)
Charles Maples Manuscript files for download
(note: file 3 was a large pdf which we had to split for upload at pdfsplit.com-free online)

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Rememberances of Charles Maples...
Maples Tokyo Requiem...