

HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER COMMAND
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SUBJECT: CENTRAL PACIFIC RCM NEWSLETTER NUMBER 9 (8 APRIL - 29 APRIL 45)
TO: AIR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER, HEADQUARTERS AAF, WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.
FROM: TECHNICAL OBSERVER S. F. KAISEL

1. PERSONAL ACTIVITIES: DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD WITH MEMBERS OF THE OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTION OF THIS COMMAND ON THE TYPE OF MATERIAL INCLUDED IN THEIR BATTLE DAMAGE STUDIES, WITH A VIEW TOWARD USING THIS INFORMATION AS AN AID IN DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE COMBINATION OF THEIR INFORMATION AND THE INFORMATION ON DISPOSITION OF JAMMING TRANSMITTERS IN AIRCRAFT WHICH WE WILL HAVE AVAILABLE WILL HELP TOWARD A SATISFACTORY ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES. A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR THE INDOCTRINATION OF STAFF AND FLIGHT CREW PERSONNEL IN THE USE OF OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES HAS BEEN DRAWN UP. THIS PROGRAM WILL INCLUDE SIMULATED OPERATIONS AGAINST SLC AND GL RADARS IN THE MARIANAS. SEVERAL DAYS WERE SPENT AT THE 314TH WING ASSISTING IN ANTENNA INSTALLATION PROBLEMS. MR. C.W. OLIPHANT ARRIVED AT HEADQUARTERS AAFPOA AND INFORMATION ON RCM EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN EXCHANGED. DR. R. D. SARD AND MR. M. P. KLEIN ARRIVED FROM SECTION 22 TO SPEND SEVERAL DAYS AT THIS HEADQUARTERS DISCUSSING RCM PROBLEMS. CALCULATION OF MINIMUM JAMMING RANGE UNDER DIFFERENT CONDITIONS OF OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AND ARE NOW BEING REVISED IN THE LIGHT OF DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH DR. SARD.

2. GENERAL: THE MONTH OF APRIL HAS SEEN THE FIRST WIDE SCALE USE OF OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES IN THE XXI BOMBER COMMAND. THE DECISION TO INITIATE THE OFFENSIVE RCM HAS BEEN PROMPTED BY SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS. FIRST, THE EFFECTIVE ENEMY USE OF SEARCHLIGHTS, WHICH APPEAR TO BE RADAR CONTROLLED, AGAINST OUR NIGHT STRIKES HAS BECOME A SERIOUS PROBLEM. ACCURATE FLAK AND FIGHTER ATTACKS HAVE BEEN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY DIRECTED AGAINST AIRCRAFT ILLUMINATED BY SEARCHLIGHTS, AND HAVE SHOWN EXCELLENT COORDINATION. THE USE OF ROPE HAS DEFINITELY PROVED TO BE AN AID IN EVADING SEARCHLIGHTS AND ELECTRONIC JAMMERS MAY BE EXPECTED TO FURTHER DESTROY SEARCHLIGHT ACCURACY. HEAVY LOSSES WERE EXPECTED ON CERTAIN OF THE DAYLIGHT MISSIONS AND IT WAS FELT THAT ANYTHING THAT RCM COULD CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING FLAK LOSSES WOULD JUSTIFY THE EFFORT INVOLVED. FINALLY THE ELEMENT OF SECURITY COULD BE IGNORED BECAUSE JAMMERS AND ROPE HAVE BEEN USED AGAINST THE JAPANESE MAINLAND AND FORMOSA BY THE NAVY AND THE FIFTH AIR FORCE. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE OFFENSIVE RCM PROGRAM WILL GROW IN SIZE AS MORE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ARE RECEIVED.

DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS IN FORMATION APPEAR TO BE THE EASIEST TO PROTECT WITH OFFENSIVE RCM. THE OPERATIONAL PLAN CALLS FOR THE BOMB RUN TO BE MADE IN A COLUMN OF SQUADRONS, WITH A MAXIMUM INTERVAL OF ABOUT ONE-HALF MILE BETWEEN SQUADRONS. THE BOMB RUN FROM IP TO TARGET AVERAGES APPROXIMATELY SIX MINUTES AND NO EVASIVE ACTION IS TAKEN ON THE BOMB RUN. A SQUADRON

WILL CONTAIN 9-11 AIRCRAFT AND ALTITUDE OF ATTACK WILL BE BETWEEN TEN TO TWENTY THOUSAND FEET. TENTATIVE RCM PLANS ARE TO HAVE THE LEADING SQUADRON DISPENSE ROPE, AND TO REINFEST THE ROPE TRAIL FROM SUCCEEDING SQUADRONS AS OFTEN AS MAY BE NECESSARY. FOR ELECTRONIC JAMMING EACH SQUADRON WILL BE MADE SELF SUFFICIENT, USING BARRAGE JAMMING AUGMENTED BY PERHAPS TWO AIRCRAFT HAVING SPOT JAMMING INSTALLATIONS. BOTH THE 75 MC AND 200 MC GL BANDS WILL HAVE TO BE COVERED. THE ONLY OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED ARE THE FACT THAT DUE TO ASSEMBLY DIFFICULTIES THE ORDER OF SQUADRONS IN THE COLUMN MAY NOT BE AS PLANNED AND THE LEADING SQUADRON MIGHT NOT DISPENSE ROPE. ALSO, BECAUSE OF THE ASSEMBLY DIFFICULTIES, PART OF THE AIRCRAFT OF ONE SQUADRON MAY MAKE THE BOMB RUN WITH THOSE OF ANOTHER SQUADRON, LEADING TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A NON-UNIFORM BARRAGE. HOWEVER, ASSEMBLY TECHNIQUE IS STEADILY IMPROVING AND THE PREVIOUS CONSIDERATIONS MAY BE OF NO CONSEQUENCE.

NIGHT STRIKES WILL BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT TO PROTECT. THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON LOW ALTITUDE NIGHT STRIKES IS TO GET AS MANY AIRCRAFT OVER THE TARGET IN THE MINIMUM TIME POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A SATURATION OF ENEMY DEFENSES. THE AIRCRAFT ARE ALL BRIEFED TO FLY THE SAME COURSE, BUT DO NOT GO IN IN ANY PARTICULAR ORDER. CONSEQUENTLY THERE IS A CONTINUOUS STREAM OF AIRCRAFT ON APPROXIMATELY THE SAME HEADING, AT SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT ALTITUDES ON THE BOMB RUN. THE BOMB RUN FROM IP TO TARGET AVERAGES ABOUT SIX MINUTES AND IT IS POSSIBLE TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION UNTIL WITHIN TWO MINUTES OF THE TARGET. TWO PLANS ARE POSSIBLE FOR THE USE OF ROPE. EVERY AIRCRAFT CAN DISPENSE ROPE ON THE BOMB RUN, WHICH SHOULD OFFER PROTECTION TO ALL EXCEPT LEADING ELEMENT, PROVIDED THAT THERE ARE NO GAPS IN THE STREAM OF AIRCRAFT. TO ENSURE A MORE UNIFORM ROPE TRAIL SEVERAL B-29'S COULD BE EMPLOYED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LAYING THE ROPE TRAIL AT A HIGHER ALTITUDE, SO THAT IT WOULD FALL TO THE ALTITUDE OF THE MAIN STREAM OF BOMBERS BY THE TIME THAT THE FIRST ELEMENTS LEAVE THE IP AND PROTECT LEADING ELEMENTS. ALL AIRCRAFT IN THE BOMBER STREAM WOULD ALSO DISPENSE ROPE ON THE BOMB RUN FOR ADDED PROTECTION. THE VAGARIES OF UPPER LEVEL WINDS MIGHT MAKE THIS PLAN IMPRACTICAL. FOR ELECTRONIC JAMMING ABOUT THE ONLY THING THAT CAN BE DONE IS TO SET UP A BARRAGE WITHIN EACH SQUADRON, TO MAKE IT SELF SUFFICIENT, AND THEN HOPE THAT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRANSMITTERS IN ALL AIRCRAFT MAKING THE BOMB RUN WITHIN A BEAM WIDTH, WILL STILL GIVE A SATISFACTORY BARRAGE. THE TWO SPOT JAMMING OPERATORS PER SQUADRON WOULD PROBABLY BE INSTRUCTED TO EACH JAM THE THREE LOUDEST SIGNALS THAT THEY HEARD, THUS OFFERING SOME PROTECTION TO ADJACENT AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT THAT WERE USED TO ORIGINALLY LAY THE ROPE TRAIL MIGHT ALSO BE LOADED WITH THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF JAMMERS POSSIBLE, TO BARRAGE THE FREQUENCY BAND.

THE PLAN OF USING SEVERAL B-29'S SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISPENSING ROPE AND CARRYING JAMMERS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH A FEW OF THE OPERATIONS PEOPLE WHO CONCUR IN THE PLAN IF IT IS NECESSARY. EXPERIENCE SO FAR HAS INDICATED THAT ONE OR TWO LONE B-29'S AT AN ALTITUDE ABOVE THE MAIN FORMATIONS HAVE LITTLE TO FEAR FROM FIGHTERS OR FLAK.

3. RADAR INTERCEPTS: RADAR INTERCEPTS WILL NOT BE INCLUDED IN THESE NEWSLETTERS BECAUSE OF LACK OF TIME TO GATHER THE DATA. IT IS BELIEVED THAT ANNEX C PART I (RCM SECTION) OF THE XXI BOMBER COMMAND CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT IS BEING DISTRIBUTED THROUGH J.E.I.A. TO THE SAME AGENCIES THAT ARE ON THE DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR THIS NEWSLETTER. NEW OR UNUSUAL SIGNALS ONLY, WILL BE MENTIONED IN THIS SECTION.

4. OFFENSIVE COUNTER MEASURES: THE REPORTS RECEIVED FROM THE WINGS ON THE JAMMING MISSION OF 7 APRIL 1945 DID NOT CONTAIN THE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE DISPOSITION OF THE JAMMERS IN THE AIRCRAFT THAT WAS EXPECTED, AND NO ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNTER MEASURES CAN BE MADE.

THE 73RD WING HIT TOKYO ON THIS MISSION, WITH 107 AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE AND CARRIED A TOTAL OF 106 TRANSMITTERS, USUALLY UTILIZING 10 APT-1 AND 2 APQ-2 PER SQUADRON. EACH SQUADRON WAS MADE SELF-SUFFICIENT AND THE TRANSMITTERS WERE UNIFORMLY SPACED OVER THE BAND 185-205 MC. BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF COMPLETE GROUP A PARTS IN SOME AIRCRAFT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PUT TWO TRANSMITTERS IN SOME AIRCRAFT AND NONE IN OTHERS. ROPE WAS DISPENSED FROM THE LEADING SQUADRON OF THE COLUMN OF SQUADRONS, FROM THE COASTLINE GOING IN TO FIVE MILES PAST THE TARGET AREA ON THE WAY OUT. A DISPENSING RATE OF TEN BUNDLES PER SECOND FOR THE SQUADRON WAS SET UP AND EACH PLANE WAS EQUIPPED WITH A CHUTE MOUNTED IN THE CAMERA HATCH. LACK OF SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES OF ROPE PREVENTED MORE EXTENSIVE USE OF RR-3/U, BUT AT THAT, OF THE 6000 BUNDLES AVAILABLE ONLY 3500 WERE DISPENSED. ONE OBSERVER MONITORED THE BARRAGE WHICH APPEARED TO BE FAIRLY UNIFORM, BUT DUE TO THE RELATIVE POSITION OF AIRCRAFT, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT AN OBSERVER WITHIN THE FORMATION COULD SUCCESSFULLY DETERMINE THE UNIFORMITY OF THE BARRAGE. ONE GL SIGNAL WAS HEARD OUTSIDE THE BARRAGE AT 182 MCS. NO OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE AT 75 MCS.

THE 313TH WING HIT NAGOYA ON THIS MISSION WITH 131 AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE AND CARRIED 87 JAMMERS. THE BAND 85-205 MC WAS BARRAGED WITH UNIFORM SPACING OF THE APT-1 AND APQ-2'S. EACH SQUADRON WAS MADE SELF SUFFICIENT. SIXTY THREE OF THE TRANSMITTERS WERE IN USE OVER THE TARGET AREA. RR-3/U WAS DISPENSED OVER THE TARGET AREA FROM THE LEADING AND MIDDLE SQUADRONS IN THE WING AT A RATE OF 10 BUNDLES PER SECOND FOR THE SQUADRON. FOUR THOUSAND BUNDLES OF RR-3/U WERE AVAILABLE FOR THE MISSION AND ALL WERE DISPENSED.

THE 314TH WING HIT NAGOYA ALONG WITH THE 313TH WING ON THIS MISSION WITH 63 AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE AND CARRIED 54 APT-1. EACH SQUADRON HAD AT LEAST NINE JAMMERS SPACED 2 MCS APART. ROPE WAS DISPENSED AS IN THE 313TH WING, WITH 4000 BUNDLES OF RR-3/U AVAILABLE AND 3000 BUNDLES ACTUALLY DISPENSED.

DUE TO ASSEMBLY DIFFICULTIES THE 314TH WING PICKED UP ABOUT 20 PLANES FROM THE 313TH WING AND THE BARRAGES IN THE TWO WINGS WERE NOT AS PLANNED. SOME OF THE ROPE DISPENSING AIRCRAFT IN THE 313TH WING WERE NOT IN PROPER POSITION DUE TO THE ASSEMBLY DIFFICULTIES AND CONSEQUENTLY DID NOT DISPENSE ROPE AS SCHEDULED.

THE RCM PERSONNEL IN THE COMMAND DID AN EXCELLENT JOB, CONSIDERING THE FACT THE PRELIMINARY NOTICE OF THE USE OF ELECTRONIC JAMMING WAS ONLY GIVEN 36 HOURS BEFORE TAKEOFF, AND FINAL WORD WAS GIVEN ABOUT 12 HOURS BEFORE TAKEOFF. IN SPITE OF THE POOR STORAGE FACILITIES ALL OF THE JAMMERS SEEMED TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE, WITH ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF MALFUNCTIONS BEING REPORTED. THE MAJORITY OF THE MALFUNCTIONS WERE DUE TO DEFECTIVE TUBES (832'S AND 398'S). AT-36/APT, CUT-DOWN AT-37/APT AND AT-38/APT, AND IFF ANTENNAS CUT TO FREQUENCY WERE USED AS TRANSMITTING ANTENNAS. TRANSMITTERS WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED, TUNED TO FREQUENCY ON THE BENCH USING EITHER THE BC-1255A, APR-4 OR TS-174/U, AND THEN PRE-FLIGHTED IN THE PLANES USING THE TS-131/AP FOR A POWER OUTPUT CHECK. WHEN TIME WAS AVAILABLE FREQUENCY WAS AGAIN CHECKED AT THE PLANE.

SOME EXPERIMENTS HAVE BEEN RUN TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF ROPE ON SEARCHLIGHTS. ON THE MISSION 13 APRIL 1945 TO TOKYO ARSENAL TWO AIRCRAFT OF THE 314TH WING WERE SUPPLIED WITH RR-3/U AND IN ONE OF THE TWO AIRCRAFT IT WAS FOUND THAT WHEN THEY WERE "CONED", THROWING OUT TEN BUNDLES WOULD CAUSE THE LIGHTS TO DRIFT OFF THE SHIP, TO THE REAR. ON THE BASIS OF THIS, 80 UNITS EACH WERE PLACED IN SIX AIRCRAFT FOR THE 15 APRIL MISSION TO KAW-ASAKI. THE MEN DISPENSING WERE BRIEFED TO THROW OUT 5-6 BUNDLES WHEN A SEARCHLIGHT HIT THE SHIP, AND TO DISPENSE AT A RATE OF 1 UNIT PER SECOND WHEN THE FLAK LOOKED DANGEROUS, ONE AIRCRAFT FAILED TO RETURN, AND FOUR OF THE REMAINING FIVE REPORTED BETWEEN THREE TO SIX SUCCESSFUL EVASIONS OF SEARCHLIGHTS AND WERE CONVINCED OF THE EFFICACY OF THE METHOD. THE FIFTH SHIP REPORTED LACK OF SUCCESS IN TWO INSTANCES OF "CONING", BUT THE GUNNER REPORTED THAT AT THE TIME THAT ROPE WAS THROWN OUT SEVERAL OTHER SEARCHLIGHTS SUDDENLY CONVERGED BEHIND THE AIRCRAFT. ON A MISSION TO TOKYO ON 13 APRIL 1945 THE 73RD WING REPORTED THAT THE USE OF ROPE CAUSED SEARCHLIGHT AND FLAK TO BE DIRECTED AT THE ROPE, THE AIRCRAFT WAS UNTOUCHED. TWO SEPARATE INSTANCES OF SEARCHLIGHT EVASION WERE REPORTED BY THE 73RD WING ON THIS MISSION.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAS AUTHORIZED FULL SCALE USE OF ROPE, BUT TO CONSERVE OUR MEAGER SUPPLY OUTSTANDING DIRECTIVES TO THE WINGS PROVIDE THAT IT ONLY BE USED AT NIGHT OR UNDER CONDITIONS OF POOR VISIBILITY IN THE DAYTIME. A REGULATION BEING ISSUED STATES THAT 3 BUNDLES OF RR-3/U SHOULD BE DROPPED EVERY 10 SECONDS WHENEVER THE PLANE IS IN TROUBLE FROM SEARCHLIGHT OR FLAK. THIS SHOULD CREATE A NUMBER OF DISCRETE ECHOES ON THE ENEMY RADAR, LEADING TO TEMPORARY CONFUSION. THIS SHOULD BE GOOD FOR A MONTH, PERHAPS UNTIL THE JAPS DEVELOP THEIR TECHNIQUE AGAINST IT.

5. EQUIPMENT NOTES: OBJECTIONS WERE VOICED BY THE A-3 SECTION TO THE WRIGHT FIELD MOCKUP OF THE A-1 DISPENSER IN THE RIGHT CATWALK OF THE REAR BOMB-BAY IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THIS INSTALLATION PREVENTED THE LOADING OF TWO 500 POUND BOMBS AND PREVENTED THE BOMBARDIER FROM REMOVING THE ARMING WIRES ON BOMBS ON THAT SIDE OF THE BOMB-BAY. THE PROBLEM THEN RESOLVED ITSELF INTO A CHOICE BETWEEN THE LOCATION IN THE REAR IMPRESSURIZED TAIL SECTION OR AN INSTALLATION OVER THE LEFT WING SECTION BETWEEN THE BOMB-BAYS. THE OVER WING INSTALLATION WAS DECIDED UPON AS BEING MOST DESIRABLE AND A MOCKUP HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR ABOUT A WEEK. AS AN INTERIM MEASURE AUTHORIZATION HAS BEEN MADE TO CONSTRUCT 60 TEMPORARY CHUTES PER WING TO AID IN ROPE DISPENSING. THESE WILL BE MOUNTED IN THE REAR CAMERA HATCH OPENING.

TWO M4505 ANTENNA HEADS FOR THE APA-17 HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND WILL BE USED ON THE FERRETS IMMEDIATELY. FOUR M-2413 RF SWITCHES, FOUR M-2415 RF SWITCHES, TWO L-901 VIDEO AMPLIFIERS, ONE M-3010 TEST OSCILLATOR AND TWO D-1907 SPURIOUS RESPONSE INDICATORS HAVE ALSO BEEN RECEIVED FROM RRL.

THE TWO L-901 WERE GIVEN TO THE 11TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP OF THE SEVENTH AIR FORCE FOR USE IN THE SCR717B. THEY HAVE BEEN HAVING PROBLEMS WITH SEA RETURN PREVENTING TARGET TRACKING AT SHORT RANGES AND THE L-901 CLEARED THIS TROUBLE UP TO THEIR SATISFACTION. THEY ARE QUITE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SHORT TIME CONSTANT CIRCUIT. THE MATTER HAS BEEN REFERRED TO THE RADAR OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AAFPOA FOR FURTHER ACTION.

AUTHORIZATION HAS BEEN ISSUED TO: (1) REMOVE THE CHEMICAL TOILET FROM THE RCM OPERATOR'S POSITION. (2) MOVE THE APQ-13 MODULATOR, (3) TO INSTALL THE EXTRA RADAR OPERATOR'S CHAIR IN THE RCM OBSERVER'S POSITION.

THIS WAS AUTHORIZED FOR THREE PLANES PER SQUADRON AND SHOULD ALLOW A MATERIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE COMFORT OF THE RCM OPERATOR'S POSITION. THE TOILET IS TO BE REMOUNTED IN THE REAR RIGHT HAND PORTION OF THE RADAR COMPARTMENT AND THE MODULATOR IS BEING INSTALLED UNDER THE LEFT SIDE OF THE RADAR OPERATOR'S TABLE. INSTALLATION OF OXYGEN FACILITIES, HEATED SUIT OUTLET, AND INTERPHONE JACKBOX HAS ALSO BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR THREE AIRCRAFT PER SQUADRON. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT SIMILAR CHANGES BE INCORPORATED IN ALL AIRCRAFT FOR THIS COMMAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT A SPOT JAMMING PROGRAM FOR THIS COMMAND SEEMS IMMINENT, THESE MODIFICATIONS SEEM ESPECIALLY NECESSARY.

THE SUPPLY OF RR-3/U IN THE COMMAND IS VERY CRITICAL. 75,000 BUNDLES WERE RECEIVED AROUND APRIL 10, AND ANOTHER SHIPMENT OF 75000 AT THE END OF APRIL. THE USE OF ROPE IS BEING CURTAILED FOR THIS REASON.

THE SNOOPER ANTENNAS BEING OBTAINED FROM THE NAVY HAVE TURNED OUT TO BE APA-24'S. TWO ARE ON THEIR WAY FROM OAHU BY AIR, WITH 22 TO FOLLOW. A MOCKUP WILL BE MADE IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIVING THE FIRST ANTENNAS.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: THREE FERRETS WERE TURNED OUT OF THE DEPOT ON APRIL 27 AND THE FOURTH IS DUE IN A DAY OR TWO. AS OPERATIONAL TRAINING FERRETS WILL BE PUT TO WORK PIN-POINTING THE RADARS IN THE ISLAND CHAIN BETWEEN THE MARIANAS AND TOKYO. FURTHER PLANS FOR FERRET OPERATIONS ARE NOT DEFINITE AT THIS TIME. INFORMAL ADVICE HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT A COMMUNICATIONS FERRET IS AVAILABLE TO THIS COMMAND. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN A COMMUNICATIONS FERRET TO AUGMENT THE COMMUNICATIONS SEARCH WORK DONE BY THE SRTIKE AIRCRAFT. IT IS EXPECTED THAT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN SHORTLY TO REQUEST THAT THIS FERRET BE ASSIGNED TO THE FERRET DETACHMENT UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THIS COMMAND

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